Modeling the lease contract (for House) in Islamic Economics Using Contract Theory
Document Type : Original Article
Abstract
This research aims to study lease contract among set of Islamic contracts by explaining the importance and necessity of detailed study about Islamic contracts and contractual approach to Islamic economics. In this regard by considering asymmetric information as the most important challenge facing lease contract, we will study lease contract using contract theory and incentives economics. For this purpose, using a library method we study the various aspects of asymmetry of information in the lease contract considering Islamic economics and we construct a mathematical model to solve the problem. Finally we reach theoretical model that can design optimal contracts for lease of house (by replacing parameters) in a way that adverse selection problem will be solved. Then we use hypothetical parameters to solve the constructed model using LINGO software, for testing the model.
صالحآبادی، علی، سجاد سیاح و مهدی نجفی؛ «تبیین فقهی و ارائه الگوی تکنیکی ـ بازاریابی در طراحی و راهاندازی اوراق اجاره در ایران»؛ جستارهای اقتصادی، س8، ش15، 1390.
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