Islamic Economics

Islamic Economics

Self-Organization of Jihad in the Holy Qur'an: Conditional Cooperation or Preference Transformation? Towards an Islamic Theory

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Vahid Moghadam 1
Mohamad Vaez Barzani 2
Hamed Abedi 3
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) Studies, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
3 Graduated with a Master's degree in Islamic Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
10.22034/iec.2025.2017908.2695
Abstract
Ensuring security is the primary goal of any government, while the purification of believers is a central aim of a faith-based community. Numerous verses in the Qur’an describe the Prophet’s military campaigns, which were organized through self-organization (voluntary participation) to address the free-rider problem caused by self-interest.In the conditional cooperation framework of self-organization, the motivation to reciprocate is central. Another motivation, rooted in the desire for the Hereafter, can also enhance voluntary participation. What is the Qur’an’s main motivational focus in the context of Jihad, and how does it utilize that focus? To answer this question, the paper examines the application of two theoretical frameworks from behavioral and experimental economics: conditional cooperation and preference transformation. First, verses on Jihad from the Qur'an are collected. Then, within various mechanisms known to reduce free-riding—such as identity, leadership, punishment, and differentiation—two forms of motivation (reciprocity and Hereafter-orientation) are identified and compared. The findings suggest two main conclusions: First, the primary motivational emphasis in the Qur’an is on Hereafter-oriented incentives. Second, the Qur’an does not treat this motivation as given, but rather aims to cultivate it through the process of Jihad (tamḥīṣ al-qulūb – the purification of hearts). Thus, Jihad-related self-organization in the Qur’an may be seen as a distinct form of collective action—unconditional cooperation grounded in the transformation of individual preferences.
Keywords
Self-interest
Jihad self-organization
Holy Qur'an
conditional cooperation
unconditional cooperation
transformation of preferences
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