بررسیها نشان میدهد که مسئله مخاطره اخلاقی ناشی از عدم گزارش صحیح سود توسط گیرنده وجوه در قراردادهای مشارکت در سود و زیان، مهمترین مسئله بانکها (تأمین مالی کننده) در عدم به‌کارگیری این نوع قراردادهاست؛ بنابراین توفیق کاربرد شیوه‌های تأمین مالی مشارکت در سود، به حل مسائل اطلاعات نامتقارن مرتبط با استفاده از آنها بستگی خواهد داشت. تحقیق حاضر در مورد روابط طرفین در قراردادهای تأمین مالی به روش مشارکت در سود و زیان بحث نموده و ویژگیهای یک قرارداد انگیزه ـ سازگار که مسئله اطلاعات نامتقارن برخاسته در این رابطه را کنترل میکند، طرح مینماید. هدف تحقیق ارائه یک الگوی قرارداد انگیزه ـ سازگار است؛ به‌گونهای‌که با تأسی از آیات و روایات اسلامی، بر تشویق و پاداش در صورت ارائه اطلاعات صحیح از سوی گیرنده وجوه متکی است. برای دستیابی به هدف فوق، از یک تحلیل نظری در قالب یک مدل ریاضی استفاده و این نتیجه حاصل شد که حسابرسی تصادفی همراه با افزایش سهم سود گیرنده وجوه در صورت ارائه گزارش درست ـ به عنوان پاداش درستکاری ـ، یک ساختار انگیزشی ارائه میدهد که منجر به کاهش مسئله مخاطره اخلاقی خواهد شد.
Contractual motivation-compatible design reduces the moral hazard of Musharakah contracts
نویسندگان [English]
iraj Toutounchian1؛ mehdi behrad-amin2
2University of Sistan and Baluchestan
چکیده [English]
The research shows that the problem of moral hazard due to the lack of proper reporting of profit by the recipient of funds in the contracts for the participation in profit and loss is the most important issue for banks (financiers) not to use this type of contract. Therefore, the success of the use of financially-participatory finance techniques will depend on solving the asymmetric information problems associated with them. .
The present paper discusses the relationship between the parties in the financing contracts by the method of participation in profit and loss, and features a coherent incentive contract that controls the problem of asymmetric information in this regard. The purpose of the research is to provide a motivational-compatible contract model in such a way that, relying on Islamic verses and narrations, the reliance on encouragement and rewards depends on the receipt of the correct information from the recipient. In order to achieve this goal, a theoretical analysis was used in the form of a mathematical model. The result of the research is that the random audit, along with the increase in the share of the beneficiary of funds in the form of a rigorous report (as a reward for honesty), provides a motivational structure that leads reducing the moral hazard.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
Islamic finance, Participation in profit and loss, Moral hazard, Motivational-Compatible Contract
مراجع
قرآن کریم
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